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COMMENT
A PERTURBED PRAYER POLICY: WHEN PAST PRACTICE,
NOT PURPOSE, POSSESSES A PREEMINENT POSITION
Joshua N. Turnert
I. INTRODUCTION
Since at least 1947, the Supreme Court of the United States has become
an arena for religious and nonreligious parties to battle over the scope and
application of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.! Prior to 1947,
it was settled as a matter of constitutional law that the Establishment Clause
did not speak to state action.2 However, once Justice Black penned Everson
v. Board of Education,' determining that the Establishment Clause could be
wielded to proscribe government action at all levels, an entirely new slate of
cases was ushered into federal courts.' Subsequently, litigation over
everything, from cr&he displays on public property to Ten
Commandments monuments in courthouses, has found its way to the
Supreme Court. Unfortunately, this dramatic shift in Establishment Clause
t Third-year law student, Liberty University School of Law. I am very grateful for the
abiding love and support of my wife, Rachel Turner. Special thanks and acknowledgement to
Dean Jeffrey C. Tuomala for his insight and scholarship on Chief Justice Marshall and
constitutional interpretation, which was instrumental in the development of this Comment.
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ...." U.S.
CONST. amend. I; see, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
2. Note, Rethinking the Incorporation of the Establishment Clause: A Federalist View,
105 HARV. L. REv. 1700, 1701 (1992); see Permoli v. Municipality No. 1, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
589, 609 (1845) ("The Constitution makes no provision for protecting the citizens of the
respective states in their religious liberties; this is left to the state constitutions and laws: nor
is there any inhibition imposed by the Constitution of the United States in this respect on the
states.").
3. Everson, 330 U.S. at 3.
4. Compare Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 603 n.4 (1992) (finding that "[s]ince 1971,
the Court has decided 31 Establishment Clause cases"), with Note, supra note 2, at 1701
(noting that "very few Establishment Clause cases [were] decided before World War II" and
citing only two cases).
5. See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 579-81 (1989) (holding unconstitutional a cr&he displayed on
government property); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984) (upholding a cr&he
displayed on government property); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691 (2005) (plurality
opinion) (upholding a monument depicting the Ten Commandments displayed on
government property); McCreary Cnty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844,
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jurisprudence has not been marked with consistency.6 The Supreme Court
has left lower courts floundering and uncertain as to the proper standard of
review to apply when Establishment Clause cases are brought before them.7
Currently, there is little doubt that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. in
this area is not clear and coherent, but rather, the prevailing standard
appears to be only an ad hoc analysis of disparate facts devoid of any
unifying or anchoring principle.'
Although the Supreme Court has decided many Establishment Clause
cases post-Everson, only one case has involved the tradition of legislative
prayer,9 that is, until 2014.10 In Marsh v. Chambers," the Supreme Court
found that prayer invocations at legislative and other deliberative bodies
were not a violation of the Establishment Clause,' 2 unless "the prayer
opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to
disparage any other, faith or belief."3 The Court in Marsh had seemingly
carved out a special Establishment Clause test for legislative prayer analysis,
one that ignored the previous Establishment Clause tests,14 but instead was
history-based." Yet, much room was left for debate regarding the scope and
applicability of the Marsh holding.16
881 (2005) (holding unconstitutional a monument depicting the Ten Commandments
displayed on government property).
6. See infra Part III.A.
7. See infra Part III.A.
8. Utah Highway Patrol Ass'n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 21 (2011) (noting
that the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence invites erratic, selective
analysis where the outcome of constitutional cases rests on the personal preferences of
judges, rather than firmer, less arbitrary grounds).
9. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
10. For the first time since 1983, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to the legislative
prayer case of Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 26 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S.
Ct. 2388 (U.S. 2013), rev'd sub nom., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
11. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
12. Id. at 786.
13. Id. at 794-95.
14. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (noting that "[i]n two cases, the
Court did not even apply the Lemon 'test.' We did not, for example, consider that analysis
relevant in Marsh....").
15. Galloway, 681 F.3d at 26 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding that "the Marsh Court conducted a
largely historical analysis, looking to the 'unique history' of legislative prayer in America
before turning to the particulars of the Nebraska Legislature's chaplaincy program.").
16. See, e.g., Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 302 (4th Cir. 2004)
(concluding that the "Supreme Court's apparent intent [was] to confine its holding in Marsh
to the specific 'circumstances' before it-a nonsectarian prayer preceding public business,
directed only at the legislators themselves."). Wynne noted that, "in the more than twenty
[Vol. 9:405
A PERTURBED PRAYER POLICY
The Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence was ripe for challenging
and resulted in the numerous legislative prayer cases. 7 Cities across the
country were held captive in the "Establishment Clause purgatory."'" Some
courts interpreted Marsh as outright precluding sectarian prayers.19 Others
were convinced that Marsh explicitly upheld prayers that contained
sectarian references.2" Still other courts understood Marsh as requiring a
balancing test.2 ' The fractures in the circuits were leading to circuit-specific
tests and standards that resulted in different outcomes based on where the
legislative or deliberative body being challenged was located.22 The only
outcome that could be expected was not one based on rule but one based on
judicial indigestion. 3
It was only a matter of time before the Supreme Court would have to step
in and lend direction to the lower courts. Circuits were all over the map in
regards to whether, and what kind of, legislative prayer was permissible
years since Marsh, the Court has never found its analysis applicable to any other
circumstances; rather, the Court has twice specifically refused to extend the Marsh approach
to other situations." Id.; see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992); Cnty. of
Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989).
Similarly, some Circuit Courts have also refused to extend Marsh. See, e.g., Coles v.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 381 (6th Cir. 1999); N.C. Civil Liberties Union Legal
Found. v. Constangy, 947 F.2d 1145, 1148-49 (4th Cir. 1991).
17. See, e.g., Rubin v. City of Lancaster, 710 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied
before judgment, 13-89, 2013 WL 3789507 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2013); Galloway v. Town of Greece,
681 F.3d 20, 26 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2388 (U.S. 2013), rev'd sub nom.,
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014); Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d
292, 302 (4th Cir. 2004).
18. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky. v. Mercer Cnty., 432 F.3d 624, 636 (6th Cir. 2005).
19. See, e.g., Simpson v. Chesterfield Cnty. Bd. of Sup'rs, 404 F.3d 276, 287 (4th Cir.
2005) (holding that sectarian invocations are forbidden).
20. See, e.g., Rubin v. City of Lancaster, 710 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied
before judgment, 13-89, 2013 WL 3789507 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2013) (finding that the "history and
tradition" anchoring of Marsh's holding specifically encompassed sectarian legislative
prayer).
21. See, e.g., Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 29 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted,
133 S. Ct. 2388 (U.S. 2013) (rejecting an inquiry that looked solely to whether the town's
legislative prayer practice contained sectarian references, but rather asking "whether the
town's practice, viewed in its totality by an ordinary, reasonable observer, conveyed the view
that the town favored or disfavored certain religious beliefs.").
22. Compare Galloway, 681 F.3d at 34 (finding the prayer policy of the Town of Greece,
New York unconstitutional), with Rubin, 710 F.3d at 1101-02 (finding the prayer policy of
the City of Lancaster, California constitutional). The prayer policies in the towns of Greece
and Lancaster did not differ in any significant way.
23. Alex Kozinski, What I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial Decision
Making, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 993,993 (1993).
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under the Establishment Clause.24 The aimless standards the Supreme
Court has utilized in Establishment Clause cases have not resulted in
coherent outcomes in the lower courts. Enter Town of Greece v. Galloway.25
Although the Court granted Galloway certiorari in order to address severe
inconsistency in the circuits,26 the decision handed down by the Court is
likely to have the shelf life of Marsh. Instead, the standards of Galloway
seem destined to suffer the same fate as other notable Establishment Clause
standards, such as the ones set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman27 and Lynch v.
Donnelly.2 These standards have resulted in inconsistent interpretation and
application, not just by lower courts, but by the Supreme Court as well.29
The solution for these issues is not a clarification of which of the existent
tests to use, or even the creation of a new test. A coherent and consistent
jurisprudence in this area will only result if the Court looks back to
traditional methods of constitutional interpretation.0 In order to resolve
the current issues attendant Establishment Clause jurisprudence, judges
must consider not only the letter of the Establishment Clause, but also the
spirit, or object, of the Establishment Clause. A proliferation of tests that
continue to ignore the object of the Establishment Clause will only further
perpetuate confusing and inconsistent judgments. Likewise, a continuation
of the existing, objectless standards will not address the lack of clarity that
presently marks Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Until the courts
return to an examination of both the purpose and text of the Establishment
Clause, there is no hope for a consistent, coherent, or even predictable
24. Galloway, 681 F.3d at 28.
Various circuit court decisions, drawing on the Court's language in Allegheny,
have questioned the validity of all forms of "sectarian" prayers. In the most
recent of these, Judge Wilkinson wrote for the Fourth Circuit that Marsh and
Allegheny, read together, seek both to acknowledge that legislative prayer can
"solemnize the weighty task of governance" and to minimize the risks of
"sectarian strife" such prayer may generate by requiring that invocations
"embrace a non-sectarian ideal."
Id.
25. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
26. See infra Part III.A.2.
27. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 404 U.S. 876 (1971).
28. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
29. See, e.g., Lisa M. Kahle, Making "Lemon-Aid"from the Supreme Court's Lemon: Why
Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence Should Be Replaced by a Modified Coercion Test,
42 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 349, 363-68 (2005) (concluding that both the Lemon test and the
Endorsement test are inherently flawed, which prevent the tests from being practically
workable or useful).
30. See infra Part IV.
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Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Specifically, this Comment will argue
that Establishment Clause jurisprudence will only find clarity once it is
positioned and analyzed with reference to both the letter and spirit of the
Establishment Clause.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Where it First Went Wrong
In Cooley v. Board of Wardens,3 constitutional interpretation began to
depart from previously established standards. In Cooley, the Supreme Court
first discarded the object analysis that Chief Justice Marshall and the Court
had faithfully adhered to and replaced it with an analysis of the subject
only.32 First, I will introduce the methodology Chief Justice Marshall and
the Court used prior to Cooley. Then, I will discuss how Cooley undermined
this methodology.
1. The Marshall Methodology
In M'Culloch v. State,33 Chief Justice John Marshall provided a thorough
and excellent explanation of the proper method to assess the exercise of the
powers of government.34 Such care was taken because the Chief Justice
considered it indisputable that the powers granted to the government are
limited and not to be transcended.3 ' Dealing with the controversial and
sensitive question of whether the Congress of the United States had the
power to establish a national bank,36 Chief Justice Marshall carefully began
with broad principles, essentially the ground rules for constitutional
interpretation.37 Once he established general, less controversial principles of
constitutional interpretation, the Chief Justice applied those principles to
the far more debatable particular of a national bank.31
The principle Chief Justice Marshall established can be captured in one
sentence: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
31. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
32. See infra Part II.A.2
33. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
34. Id. at 421.
35. Id. (declaring that "all must admit, that the powers of the government are limited,
and that its limits are not to be transcended.").
36. Id. at 401.
37. Id. at 402-12.
38. Id. at 412-24.
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adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." 39 There are two areas of
analysis highlighted by the Chief Justice-the means and the ends." First,
the end must be legitimate and within the powers granted by the
Constitution, as defined by the letter and spirit of the Constitution.4'
Second, the means must be appropriate, plainly adapted to the end, and not
prohibited.42 Unless an exercise of power meets both of these tests, the
Marshall Court would hold the exercise of power in question to be
unconstitutional.43
Chief Justice Marshall started his analysis in M'Culloch by looking to the
ends to determine which constitutional powers were used to justify the
creation of the national bank. 4 Coming to rest on the Necessary and Proper
Clause,45 Chief Justice Marshall commenced his exposition of the letter and
spirit of the power in question.46 The Chief Justice first clarified the spirit, or
object, of the Necessary and Proper Clause.4 The State of Maryland
contended that the object of the clause was actually to restrict the
39. Id. at 401.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 407-12.
45. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 18 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or
in any Department or Officer thereof."). Although there was no enumerated power granted
to Congress to create a national bank, the Constitution "does not profess to enumerate the
means by which the powers it confers may be executed." M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 408. Chief
Justice Marshall noted the enumerated powers that the national bank was a necessary and
proper means of effecting when he wrote:
Throughout this vast republic, from the St. Croix to the Gulf of Mexico, from
the Atlantic to the Pacific, revenue is to be collected and expended, armies are
to be marched and supported. The exigencies of the nation may require, that
the treasure raised in the north should be transported to the south, that raised
in the east, conveyed to the west, or that this order should be reversed. Is that
construction of the constitution to be preferred, which would render these
operations difficult, hazardous and expensive? Can we adopt that construction
(unless the words imperiously require it), which would impute to the framers of
that instrument, when granting these powers for the public good, the intention
of impeding their exercise, by withholding a choice of means?
Id. at 408-09.
46. Id. at411-12.
47. Id. at 412.
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legislature's general right to legislate.4" To this, the Chief Justice asked, "But
could this be the object for which it was inserted?"49 The Chief Justice
thought it could not be;5" instead, the purpose of the clause was a "general
right.., of selecting means for executing the enumerated powers."5 ' In fact,
Chief Justice Marshall seemed to believe the clause explicitly stated what"general reasoning" already proved. 2
The Chief Justice then shifted his analysis to the letter of the clause. 3
Maryland argued that the word "necessary" controlled the whole sentence,
and limited the legislature's right to pass laws for the execution of the
enumerated powers only to those laws that "are indispensable, and without
which the power would be nugatory.5s4 According to Maryland, the clause"excludes the choice of means, and leaves to [C]ongress, in each case, that
only which is most direct and simple."5  These arguments were
unpersuasive to the Chief Justice.56
Chief Justice Marshall noted that the word "necessary" is used in various
senses, and in order to properly understand the word in its construction,
"the subject, the context, the intention of the person using them, are all to
be taken into view."" The subject of the word in its construction is the
execution of the enumerated powers. The intention was to insure the
beneficial execution of the enumerated powers by leaving it in the power of
Congress to adopt any means "which might be appropriate, and which were
conducive to the end."59 The Chief Justice thought it "would have been to
change, entirely, the character of the instrument, and give it the properties
of a legal code" if the word necessary were interpreted as Maryland
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at412-13.
51. Id. at412.
52. Id. at 411. The Chief Justice looked to the constitution as a whole in concluding that
the Necessary and Proper Clause only made explicit what was already implicit. The
legislature can legislate using necessary means because the people gave the legislative power
to the legislature. "That a legislature, endowed with legislative powers, can legislate, is a
proposition too self-evident to have been questioned." Id. at 413.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 415.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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asserted.60 "To have declared, that the best means shall not be used, but
those alone, without which the power given would be nugatory, would have
been to deprive the legislature of the capacity to avail itself of experience, to
exercise its reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances. "61
The Chief Justice found that "the intention of the convention, as manifested
in the whole clause". "most conclusively demonstrate[d] the error of the
construction contended for by the counsel for the state of Maryland."62 To
the Chief Justice, it was too apparent for controversy that Congress "might
employ those [means] which, in its judgment, would most advantageously
effect the object to be accomplished. That any means adapted to the end,
any means which tended directly to the execution of the constitutional
powers of the government, were in themselves constitutional."63
Finally, the Chief Justice concluded his analysis by assessing the creation
of a national bank as a means of carrying out the enumerated powers of
Congress.' 4 The means must be appropriate, plainly adapted to the end, and
not prohibited by the Constitution.65  The Chief Justice found no
prohibition in the Constitution because:
If a corporation may be employed, indiscriminately with other
means, to carry into execution the powers of the government, no
particular reason can be assigned for excluding the use of a bank,
if required for its fiscal operations. To use one, must be within
the discretion of congress, if it be an appropriate mode of
executing the powers of government.66
Next, the Chief Justice held that "none can deny [the creation of the bank
was] an appropriate measure."67 Its means were adequate to its ends.6' At
this point in his opinion, Chief Justice Marshall made it a point to
distinguish between what is appropriate and what is necessary.69 While
questions regarding pretext or prohibition of chosen means are justiciable,
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 419.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 421-24.
65. Id. at 421.
66. Id. at 422.
67. Id. at 423.
68. Id. at 422, 424.
69. Id. at 423.
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questions of the degree of a chosen means' necessity are "to be discussed in
another place."7"
Should congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures
which are prohibited by the constitution; or should congress,
under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the
accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the government; it
would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case
requiring such a decision come before it, to say, that such an act
was not the law of the land. But where the law is not prohibited,
and is really calculated to effect any of the objects intrusted to the
government, to undertake here to inquire into the degree of its
necessity, would be to pass the line which circumscribes the
judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground. This
court disclaims all pretensions to such a power.71
Refusing to tread on legislative ground, the Court unanimously decided"the act to incorporate the Bank of the United States [was] a law made in
pursuance of the constitution."
Notably, Chief Justice Marshall did not start with generals and reason to
particulars simply as a dialectical strategy. Rather, the Chief Justice
considered the nature and structure of the Constitution to require such
reasoning.73 After all, judges "must never forget that it is a constitution
[they] are expounding"74 so that the Constitution would not "partake of the
prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human
mind.... Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should
be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients
which compose those objects, be deduced from the nature of the objects
themselves."75 An exercise of power by the federal government is
constitutional if its ends are legitimate, and within the scope of the letter
and spirit of the Constitution, and the means chosen are appropriate,
plainly adapted to that end, and not prohibited by the Constitution. 76 It is
the nature of the Constitution that requires the type of reasoning and
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 424.
73. Id. at 406-07.
74. Id. at 407.
75. Id. at 406-07.
76. Id. at 421.
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analysis used in the Marshall methodology to decide questions of
constitutionality.
2. A Significant Departure
In Cooley v. Board of Wardens, the Supreme Court significantly departed
from the Marshall methodology by failing to consider the object of a
constitutional provision.77 In March 1803, the Pennsylvania legislature
passed a law regulating pilots and pilotage." The purpose of the law was to
ensure the safe passage of lives and property by requiring ships to take a
person on board peculiarly skilled to avoid "the perils of a dangerous
navigation," or else pay a sum of sixty dollars.79 Cooley failed to hire a local
pilot or pay the resulting penalty.80 He challenged the law as an
unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce.8' The Pennsylvania
courts rejected Cooley's claim and he appealed to the United States
Supreme Court." The Supreme Court held the Pennsylvania law to be a
constiutional exercise of the power to regulate interstate commerce.
The Court held that the power to regulate interstate commerce was a
concurrent power that the states and federal government may both
exercise.8 4 Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the several states had
laws regulating pilotage in their harbors.8 5 Some of those laws regulated
both interstate and foreign commerce, while others regulated intrastate
commerce and were designed for health and safety purposes."s On the 7th of
August, 1789, Congress adopted the following act:
"That all pilots in the bays, inlets, rivers, harbors, and ports of the
United States shall continue to be regulated in conformity with
the existing laws of the states, respectively, wherein such pilots
may be, or with such laws as the states may respectively hereafter
77. Jeffery C. Tuomala, The Casebook Companion: The Power to Regulate Interstate
Commerce pt. 3, ch. 3, at 1 (Aug. 28, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
Liberty University Law Review).
78. Cooleyv. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 311 (1851).
79. Id. at 311,312.
80. Id. at 300.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 311.
83. Id. at321.
84. Id. at 320.
85. Tuomala, supra note 77, at pt. 3, ch. 3, at 11.
86. Id.
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enact for the purpose, until further legislative provision shall be
made by Congress."87
The Court concluded that this act suggested states had the power to regulate
interstate commerce'8 It reasoned that:
If the states were divested of the power to legislate on this subject
by the grant of the commercial power to Congress, it is plain this
act could not confer upon them power thus to legislate. If the
Constitution excluded the states from making any law regulating
commerce, certainly Congress cannot re-grant, or in any manner
re-convey to the states that power. And yet this act of 1789 gives
its sanction only to laws enacted by the states. This necessarily
implies a constitutional power [of the states] to legislate ....
[W]e are brought directly and unavoidably to the consideration
of the question whether the grant of the commercial power to
Congress did per se deprive the states of all power to regulate
pilots.89
According to the majority, "the mere grant to Congress of the power to
regulate commerce, did not deprive the states of power to regulate pilots,
and that although Congress has legislated on this subject, its legislation
manifests an intention .. .not to regulate this subject, but to leave its
regulation to the several states."90
While Cooley's outcome may have been correct,91 the Court's reasoning
was and is destructive. Because the Cooley Court accepted an argument for
the existence of concurrent power that Chief Justice Marshall rejected in
Gibbons v. Ogden,92 it failed to consider whether the object of the
87. Cooley, 53 U.S. at 317.
88. Id. at 318.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 320.
91. See, e.g., id. at 322. The stated object of the law was to promote health and safety,
which would be legitimate objects for the State of Pennsylvania under its reserved police
powers.
92. See Tuomala, supra note 77, at pt. 3, ch. 3, at 12-13.
Marshall did not view the Act of 1789 as an implicit acknowledgement that
the states have the right to regulate interstate commerce in the absence of a
conflicting federal law. He viewed the Act of 1789 as a statement by Congress
that state laws passed pursuant to their police powers which incidentally
burden interstate commerce are valid unless preempted by Congressional
legislation.
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Pennsylvania pilotage law comported with the object of the Commerce
Clause.93 The majority only considered the subject of Pennsylavania's law,
but did not look to the object of the law.94 Under the majority's rationale, it
would not have mattered if the real object of the law was to regulate
interstate commerce. All that mattered was that "[t]he act of 1789
contain[ed] a clear and authoritative declaration by the first Congress, that
the nature of this subject is such, that until Congress should find it
necessary to exert its power, it should be left to the legislation of the
states.95 It made for easy analysis to show that the subject authorized by the
act of 1789 was the same subject Pennsylvania sought to regulate.
Since the majority held that both the state and the federal government
have the power to regulate interstate commerce, the Court did not consider
a reference to the object of the law necessary.96 Unless there is a specific
constitutional prohibition, the only limitation on a state's power to regulate
interstate commerce is the discretion of Congress. 97 There is no basis to
distinguish state powers from national powers if both governments hold the
power concurrently.98 The objects are either the same or irrelevant. This
relegates as superfluous Chief Justice Marshall's test to determine whether
the regulation is "calculated to effect objects entrusted to the government."99
While the Court did attempt to limit states to local and not national matters
Both the state and federal governments may adopt the same means, e.g.,
licensing pilots, but they do so for different objects-the states for the object of
exercising police powers and the federal government for the object of
regulating interstate commerce. The object of the Commerce Clause is to
ensure the elimination of trade barriers, promote interstate commercial
harmony, and preempt the states from exercising their police powers in such a
way as to unduly interference with interstate commerce. In effect, Congress
expressed that the states were free to regulate safety in the harbors pursuant to
their police powers without fear of preemption by federal law. The 1789 statute
also, in effect, provided a statement to the courts that Congress acknowledged
that any incidental burden upon, or interference with, interstate commerce by
state pilotage regulations was permitted.
Id.
93. Cooley, 53 U.S. at 319-20.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 319.
96. See Tuomala, supra note 77, at pt. 3, ch. 3, at 13 (reasoning that as long as "the
power to regulate interstate commerce is concurrent, an object analysis can no longer be
utilized to distinguish between a state and national power.").
97. Id.; Cooley, 53 U.S. at 320.
98. See Tuomala, supra note 77, at pt. 3, ch. 3, at 13.
99. Id.
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of regulation, it provided no test to distinguish local from national
matters.' This is unsurprising given that interstate commerce by its nature
is not local.'0 1 Although Cooley dealt with the Commerce Clause,
unfortunately, its reasoning has infected other areas of law.
B. The Advent of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence in the Legislative
Prayer Context
The Establishment Clause was first brought to bear against state and
municipal governments in Everson v. Board of Education. 2  By
incorporating the Establishment Clause, Everson. laid the groundwork for
the Supreme Court to review questions of constitutionality like local
legislative prayer.'0 3 Nearly thirty years later, the constitutionality of the
centuries-old practice of legislative prayer was finally challenged in Marsh v.
Chambers.' Although Marsh upheld the practice of legislative prayer,0 5 the
question would not be put to rest so easily. Since Marsh, every circuit has
heard cases challenging the constitutionality of prayer in the governmental
setting. The controversy surrounding this issue culminated in the Supreme
Court granting certiorari in 2013 to Town of Greece v. Galloway. 6
1. Everson v. Board of Education
In Everson, a New Jersey township board of education authorized
reimbursement to parents of money expended by them for the bus
transportation of their children on regular public busses. 7 The board was
acting pursuant to a state statute that empowered local school districts to
make rules and contracts for the transportation of children to and from
schools.' 8 Some of the money reimbursed was for transportation of
children in the community to Catholic parochial schools. 9 These Catholic
schools regularly instructed their students in accordance with the religious
100. Cooley, 53 U.S. at 319.
101. Tuomala, supra note 77, at pt. 3, ch. 3, at 13.
102. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
103. Id.
104. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
105. Id. at 784.
106. Galoway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 26 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct.
2388 (U.S. 2013), rev'd sub noma., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
107. Everson, 330 U.S. at 3.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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tenets and modes of worship of the Catholic faith."' A Catholic priest was
the superintendent of these schools."' A district taxpayer challenged the
right of the Board to reimburse parents of parochial school students."' The
taxpayer argued that the statute and the Board's resolution passed pursuant
to it violated the state and federal constitutions."'
There were only two constitutional claims before the Supreme Court of
the United States with respect to the State statute and the resolution, insofar
as they authorized reimbursement to parents of children attending
parochial schools.1' 4 The first was that the statute and resolution"authorize[d] the State to take by taxation the private property of some and
bestow it upon others, to be used for their own private purposes. ' The
taxpayer argued this violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 6 The second contention was that the "statute and
the resolution forced inhabitants to pay taxes to help support and maintain
schools which are dedicated to, and which regularly teach, the Catholic
Faith."" 7 The taxpayer alleged this "to be a use of State power to support
church schools contrary to the prohibition of the First Amendment which
the Fourteenth Amendment made applicable to the states.""'
Early on, the Court set aside the taxpayer's first contention, noting that
rarely are state statutes struck down because the expenditures of the tax-
raised funds are for private purposes rather than public purposes.'19 Even
so, the Court held that it was "much too late to argue that legislation
intended to facilitate the opportunity of children to get a secular education
serves no public purpose."20 Likewise, it was too late to argue the same
against legislation intended to reimburse needy parents "for payment of the
fares of their children so that they can ride in public busses to and from
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 3-4.
114. Id. at 5.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. 5-6.
120. Id. at 7.
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schools."' The Court found that subsidies, similar to the ones challenged,
"have been commonplace practices in our state and national history."'12
The Court then turned its focus to the alleged violation of the First
Amendment, specifically the clause commanding that Congress "shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof."1 23 It began its analysis of the First Amendment claim by
citing to Murdock v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania24 as support that the
Fourteenth Amendment had made the First Amendment applicable to the
states. 2 Before assessing whether the New Jersey law impermissibly
respected the establishment of religion, the Court thought it necessary to
understand the meaning of the language of the First Amendment, especially
with respect to the imposition of taxes. 26
Looking to the beginning days of this country, the Court began by
assessing the object of the Establishment Clause. 2 1 It noted that many of the
early settlers came to escape the European laws that compelled support for
government-favored churches. 28 The Court attributed much of the civil
strife, turmoil, and persecution that were contemporaneous with
colonization of America to "established sects determined to maintain their
absolute political and religious supremacy."' 29 In Europe, men and women
were tortured, fined, cast in jail, and even killed as part of the efforts to force
loyalty to whatever religious groups that happened to be on top and in
league with the government. 3° Failure to pay taxes and tithes to support the
government-established churches were amongst some of the offenses for
which men and women were punished. 3' Many of these practices were
transplanted to the soil of the new America.'32
The charters granted by the English Crown also authorized the erection
of religious establishments in America.'33 These establishments enjoyed the
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 8.
124. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
125. Everson, 330 U.S. at 8.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 8-9.
130. Id. at 9.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 9-10.
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sponsorship of the civil authority.14 Through taxation and tithes, men and
women of various faiths were required to support these government-
sponsored churches. 3 ' However, some of the "freedom-loving colonials"
began to dissent against the imposition of taxes to pay ministers' salaries
and build churches not their own. 36 Although no single group or colony
was entirely responsible for the rights enshrined in the First Amendment,
Virginia was especially influential in the movement to secure religious
liberty for all.' According to the Court, the people of Virginia believed that
individual liberty could be achieved best under a government unable to tax
or support any or all religions, or to interfere with the religious beliefs of
individuals or groups. 3
From 1785 to 1786, when the legislative body of Virginia was attempting
to renew Virginia's tax levy for the support of the established Anglican
church, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison led the opposition against
the law.'39 Madison wrote his Memorial and Remonstrance challenging the
legitimacy of the law.' Madison's Remonstrance had its intended affect. 4'
Not only did the law ultimately fail to pass, but Virginia also passed
Jefferson's "Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty."' 42 The bill stated that to"compel a man to furnish contribution of money for the propagation of
opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical." 43 In Reynolds v.
United States,'" the Court had previously held that the provisions of the
First Amendment "had the same objective and were intended to provide the
same protection against governmental intrusion on religious liberty as the
Virginia statute."'45
The Court then turned its attention to the application of the
Establishment Clause to the New Jersey statute in question. It began by
subtly, but significantly, incorporating the Establishment Clause, finding
134. Id. at 10.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 11.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 11-12.
140. Id. at 12.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 13 (quoting An Act Establishing Religious Freedom, 12 Hening, Statutes of
Virginia 84 (1823)).
144. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
145. Everson, 330 U.S. at 13 (emphasis added).
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that "[t]here is every reason to give the same application and broad
interpretation to the 'establishment of religion' clause" as given the other
previously incorporated First Amendment' clauses."4 Next, the Court
famously wrote that the Establishment Clause at least means:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence
a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will
or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No
person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance.
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support
any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly
or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious
organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson,
the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended
to erect a wall of separation between Church and State. 47
Considering the statute in light of the object of the First Amendment, the
Court held that New Jersey did not violate the Establishment Clause. 4
While the Court held that New Jersey could not contribute tax-raised funds
to support an institution that teaches the tenets and faith of a religion,'49 it
also cautioned the state against hampering its citizens' free exercise of their
own religion. 5 ' New Jersey could extend public welfare benefits to all of its
citizens without discrimination.' The Court found that the statute in
question did just that.'52 The Court recognized that even though the statute
undoubtedly helped children get to parochial schools, the First Amendment
146. Id. at 15 ("The interrelation of these contemporary clauses was well summarized in a
statement of the Court of Appeals of South Carolina, quoted with approval by this Court, in
Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 730 20 L. Ed. 666: 'The structure of our government has, for
the preservation of civil liberty, rescued the temporal institutions from religious interference.
On the other hand, it has secured religious liberty from the invasions of the civil authority."'
(footnote omitted)).
147. Id. at 15-16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
148. Id. at 17.
149. Id. at 16.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 17.
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did not prohibit New Jersey from "spending taxraised funds to pay the bus
fares of parochial school pupils as a part of a general program under which
it pays the fares of pupils attending public and other schools."" 3 It was
crucial that the legislation provided "a general program to help parents get
their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and
from accredited schools."5 4
The Court found no difference between the statute in question and the
fact that police officers are paid with "taxraised funds" to protect children
going to and from parochial schools from the hazards of traffic.' The
majority did not think the purpose of the First Amendment was to forbid
benefits from indirectly assisting the operation of religious institutions. 6
Simply put, state power is not to be used to handicap religions any more
than it is to favor them. 7 Rather, the majority thought the purpose of the
First Amendment was to require the government to be "neutral in its
relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers," not to be
their adversary.' 8
2. Marsh v. Chambers
In Marsh, Ernest Chambers, a member of the Nebraska Legislature and a
taxpayer of Nebraska, brought suit against the Nebraska Legislature.'59
Chambers claimed that the Legislature's chaplaincy practice violated the
Establishment Clause because prayers were given in the Judeo-Christian
tradition. 6 ° The Nebraska Legislature began each of its sessions with a
prayer offered by a chaplain who was chosen biennially by the legislature
and paid out of public funds.' Robert E. Palmer, a Presbyterian minister,
served as chaplain for eighteen years at a salary of $319.75 per month for
each month the legislature was in session. 16 2
The Supreme Court held that the practice of opening legislative sessions
with prayers by state-employed clergyman did not violate the Establishment
153. Id.
154. Id. at 18.
155. Id. at 17.
156. Id. at 18.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784-85 (1983).
160. Id. at 785.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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Clause. 6 The Court came to this conclusion based on an analysis of the
practices and traditions that have existed in the United States since colonial
times." 4 Pointing to the Continental Congress in 1774, the Court noted that
the Congress adopted the traditional procedure of opening its sessions with
a prayer offered by a paid chaplain. 6 Later, under the Constitution, the
First Congress adopted the very same policy.'66 Confidently, the Court
declared: "Clearly the men who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clause
did not view paid legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a violation of
that Amendment, for the practice of opening sessions with prayer has
continued without interruption ever since that early session of Congress.' 67
The focus of the Marsh Court, thus, is very distinct from that of Everson.
Instead of following Everson's lead and analyzing the purpose of the
Establishment Clause, the Marsh Court focused on the practice, history, and
meaning attached to the Clause.
III. PROBLEM
A. No Reference to the Object Allows for Judicial Freewheeling
The primary consequence of a failure to consider the object of the First
Amendment is an unfettered judicial system. Without reference to the
underlying purpose of the First Amendment, courts are left with only the
subject to guide them. The harms associated with a failure to consider the
object of the Establishment Clause are evidenced by the present state of
affairs. Judicial freewheeling is rampant, which has resulted in: i)
inconsistency in the circuits,'68 ii) uncertainty, 69 and iii) the chilling of
fundamental rights. 7°
163. Id. at 786.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 787.
166. Id. at 788.
167. Id.
168. See infra Part III.A.1 (comparing Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 26 (2d
Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2388 (U.S. 2013), rev'd sub nom., Town of Greece v.
Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (finding that the Town's prayer policy did constitute an
unconstitutional establishment of religion) with Rubin v. City of Lancaster, 710 F.3d 1087,
1101-02 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that the City's prayer policy did not constitute an
unconstitutional establishment of religion)).
169. See infra Part III.A.2; see also supra text accompanying note 8.
170. See infra Part III.A.3.
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1. Judicial Freewheeling Results in Inconsistency
A concerning symptom of the present .Establishment Clause
jurisprudence has been the inconsistency that has plagued courts of all
levels." 1 Justice Thomas has noted that the Supreme Court's "jurisprudence
provides no principled basis by which a lower court could discern whether
Lemon/Endorsement, or some other test, should apply in Establishment
Clause cases."' The Supreme Court has altogether ignored the Lemon or
Lemon/Endorsement formulations in some.cases, 3 while, in other cases, it
has found those tests useful, but not binding. 7 4 Comparing the cases of Van
Orden v. Perry17 and McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky176 provides the
starkest example of the inconsistency plaguing even the Supreme Court in
the Establishment Clause arena. In Van Orden, a majority of the Supreme
Court did not apply the Lemon/Endorsement test in upholding a Ten
Commandments monument located on government property,7 7 but in
McCreary County, decided the very same day, the Court used the
Lemon/Endorsement test to declare a display of the Ten Commandments
on government property to be unconstitutional.7 7 As Justice Thomas
remarked, "[o]ne might be forgiven for failing to discern a workable
principle that explains these wildly divergent outcomes." 79
171. Utah Highway Patrol Ass'n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 12 (2011) (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 14. The Lemon test, as originally articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, has three
components. First, the test requires that a statute have a secular legislative purpose; second,
the statute's principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with
religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The Endorsement test, as
originally articulated in Lynch v Donnelly, further exegetes the Lemon test by asking whether
government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion, or whether
government's practice, irrespective of its purpose, conveys a message of endorsement. Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
173. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Good News Club v.
Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
174. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679 (finding that despite Lemon's usefulness, it was "unwilin[g]
to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area."); Hunt v. McNair, 413
U.S. 734, 741 (1973) (concluding that Lemon provides "no more than helpful signposts...
175. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
176. McCreary Cnty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
177. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 677.
178. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 859-66.
179. Utah Highway Patrol Ass'n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 19 (2011) (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
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The inconsistency that has persisted in the wake of the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has led to wholly contradictory
opinions by courts of all levels.' "[A] cr[6]che displayed on government
property violates the Establishment Clause, except when it doesn't.''"Likewise, a menorah displayed on government property violates the
Establishment Clause, except when it doesn't."18 2 "Finally, a cross displayed
on government property violates the Establishment Clause, as the Tenth
Circuit held here, except when it doesn't.'8 3 According to Justice Thomas,
the rampant arbitrariness wrought by the Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence should deeply trouble it.14 Presently, the "Establishment
Clause precedents remain impenetrable, and the lower courts' decisions...
180. Presently, the Ten Commandments displayed on government property violate the
Establishment Clause, only when they do not. Compare McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 844
(holding unconstitutional a monument depicting the Ten Commandments displayed on
government property), and Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Found., Inc. v. DeWeese, 633
F.3d 424 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding unconstitutional a monument depicting the Ten
Commandments and the Mayflower Compact displayed on government property), and
Green v. Haskell Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 568 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2009) (same), with Van
Orden, 545 U.S. at 677 (plurality opinion) (upholding a monument depicting the Ten
Commandments displayed on government property), and Card v. Everett, 520 F.3d 1009
(9th Cir. -2008) (same), and Am. Civil Liberties Union Neb. Found. v. Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d
772 (8th Cir. 2005) (same), and Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky. v. Mercer Cnty., 432 F.3d
624 (6th Cir. 2005) (same).
Similarly, a creche displayed on government property violates the Establishment
Clause, only when it does not. Compare, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 579-81 (1989) (holding unconstitutional a creche
displayed on government property), and Smith v. Albemarle, 895 F.2d 953, 955 (4th Cir.
1990) (same), with Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984) (upholding a crche
displayed on government property), and Elewski v. Syracuse, 123 F.3d 51, 52 (2d Cir. 1997)
(same), and Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky. v. Wilkinson, 895 F.2d 1098, 1099 (6th Cir.
1990) (same).
And a menorah displayed on government property also violates the Establishment
Clause, only when it does not. Compare Kaplan v. Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1989)
(holding unconstitutional a menorah displayed on government property), with Allegheny,
492 U.S. at 573 (upholding an eighteen-foot Chanukalh menorah displayed on government
property), and Skoros v. New York, 437 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding school policy
permitting display of menorah along with the Islamic star and crescent, the Kwanzaa kinara,
the Hebrew dreidel, and a Christmas tree, but prohibiting a cr~che).
181. Utah Highway Patrol, 132 S. Ct. at 17 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 18.
183. Id. at 19.
184. Id. at21.
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remain incapable of coherent explanation.' 185 As a result, Justice Thomas
finds it "difficult to imagine an area of the law more in need of clarity."'86
In deciding Establishment Clause cases, the Court has attempted to avoid"sweep[ing] away all government recognition and acknowledgment of the
role of religion in the lives of our citizens."'87 However, "that is precisely the
effect of the Court's repeated failure to apply the correct standard-or at
least a clear, workable standard-for adjudicating challenges to government
action under the Establishment Clause."' "Government officials, not to
mention everyday people who wish to celebrate or commemorate an
occasion with a public display that contains religious elements, cannot
afford to guess whether a federal court, applying our 'jurisprudence of
minutiae,' will conclude that a given display is sufficiently secular."8 9
Instead, the result will be a chilling effect that "purges from the public
sphere all that in any way partakes of the religious."'90
2. Uncertainty Abounds
The current Establishment Clause jurisprudence has also been marked
by uncertainty, rooted in murkiness, and decried as arbitrary. 9' The
Supreme Court has set forth such conflicting and capricious standards that
circuit courts have no touchstone to guide them. The erratic Establishment
Clause decisions handed down by the Supreme Court have caused circuits a
great deal of anxiety.19 2
185. Id. at 21-22.
.186. Id.at 22.
187. Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492
U.S. 573, 623 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
188. Utah Highway Patrol, 132 S. Ct. at 22 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
189. Id. (quoting Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 674 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part)).
190. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 699 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment); see also
infra Part 11I.B.3.
191. Utah Highway Patrol, 132 S. Ct. at 19. Justice Thomas labeled the "wildly divergent
outcomes" of Establishment Clause cases as arbitrary, concluding that "[s] uch arbitrariness is
the product of an Establishment Clause jurisprudence that does nothing to constrain judicial
discretion." Id.
. 192. See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky. v. Mercer Cnty., 432 F.3d 624, 636 (6th
Cir. 2005) (expressing frustration and confusion after McCreary and Van Orden, stating, "we
remain in Establishment Clause purgatory."); Green v. Haskell Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 574
F.3d 1235, 1235 n.1 (10th Cir. 2009) (Kelly, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)
(noting that "[w]hether Lemon ... and its progeny actually create discernable 'tests,' rather
than a mere ad hoc patchwork, is debatable" and describing the "judicial morass resulting
from the Supreme Court's opinions."); Card v. Everett, 520 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008)
(pointing to the confusion resulting from the ten individual opinions in McCreary and Van
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Apart from the problems lower courts are left with, in discerning the
appropriate test or standard to use when it comes to Establishment Clause
cases, a predicament persists on another front. Even were lower courts to
have no issue creating their own standards, it would be unfair to subject
residents of different geographies to varying standards. Two circuit court
cases decided in 2013 serve well to highlight the problems attendant with
the lack of a consistent Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
In Town of Greece v. Galloway,9 3 the Second Circuit held that the Town
of Greece's prayer policy violated the Establishment Clause.'94 In 1999, the
town of roughly 94,000 residents began inviting local clergy to the Town
Board meetings to offer an opening invocation. 9 The clergy giving the
prayer "often asked members of the audience to participate by bowing their
heads, standing, or joining in the prayer."'96 The town did not adopt any
formal policy regarding "(a) the process for inviting prayer-givers, (b) the
permissible content of prayers, or (c) any other aspect of its prayer practice,
it developed a standard procedure."' 97 Employees of the town were
responsible for inviting clergy to deliver prayers.' 9s Initially, the town
employee "solicited clergy by telephoning, at various times, all the religious
organizations listed in the town's Community Guide, a publication of the
Greece Chamber of Commerce."' 99 The employee then compiled a "Town
Board Chaplain" list containing the names of the clergy who had accepted
the town's invitations to give prayers."0 When inviting an individual to
offer the invocation at the Town Board meeting, the town employees would
work their way down the list, calling clergy about a week before each
Orden noting that courts have described the current Establishment Clause jurisprudence as
both "Establishment Clause purgatory" and "Limbo."); id. at 1023-24 (Fernandez, J.,
concurring) (describing the majority's opinion as a "heroic attempt to create a new world of
useful principle out of the Supreme Court's dark materials" in light of the "still stalking
Lemon test and the other tests and factors, which have floated to the top of this chaotic ocean
from time to time" as "so indefinite and unhelpful that Establishment Clause jurisprudence
has not become more fathomable.").
193. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 681 F.3d 20, 26 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct.
2388 (U.S. 2013), rev'd sub nom., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
194. Id. at 33.
195. Id. at 23.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 23-24.
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meeting until someone accepted.2"' The employees also periodically
updated the list "based on requests from community members and on new
listings in the Community Guide and a local newspaper, the Greece Post."2 2
The Town of Greece argued that anyone could request to give an
invocation, whether adherents of any religion, atheists, or the nonreligious,
and that no request was ever rejected.2 3 Guided by the decision in Marsh,
the Town of Greece ensured that the invocations would not be "exploited to
proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.""2 4
The town did not censor invocations, refusing to review the content of
prayers before they were delivered.2 ' The town acknowledged that it did
not publicize "that anyone may volunteer to deliver prayers or that any type
of invocation would be permissible."20 6 Even though the town had an all-
comers policy, "[iln practice, Christian clergy members have delivered
nearly all of the prayers." 207 However, a Wiccan priestess, the chairman of
the local Baha'i congregation, and a lay Jewish man all delivered prayers at
the Town Board meetings. 20 8
Many of the invocations contained explicitly Christian references.
"Roughly two-thirds contained references to 'Jesus Christ,' 'Jesus,' 'Your
Son,' or the 'Holy Spirit.' 20 9 Sometimes, "prayer-givers elaborated further,
describing Christ as 'our Savior,' 'God's only son,' 'the Lord,' or part of the
Holy Trinity."210 Once a prayer was given "in the name of the Lord and
Savior Jesus Christ, who lives with you and the Holy Spirit, one God for
ever and ever."21' Other prayers given by Christian clergy were in more
general theistic language, referring to "God of all creation," "Heavenly
Father," and God's "kingdom of Heaven. 212 Likewise, the Wiccan priestess,
Jewish prayer-giver, and Baha'i prayer-giver all referenced their gods.213 The
invocations typically gave thanks and requested assistance with the town
201. Id. at 24.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 23.
204. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794-95 (1983).
205. Galloway, 681 F.3d at 23.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 24.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 24-25.
213. Id. 25.
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governance.214 Prayer-givers usually opened with some variant of "let us
pray," and then spoke ostensibly on behalf of the audience or the town
more broadly.215 "Members of the audience and the Board have bowed their
heads, stood, and participated in the prayers by saying 'Amen.' 216
However, in Rubin v. City of Lancaster,1 7 the Ninth Circuit held that the
City of Lancaster's prayer policy, a policy very similar to the policy of the
Town of Greece, did not violate the Establishment Clause."' Prior to
August 25, 2009, the City had an informal prayer policy.2"9 Due to a "cease-
and-desist letter from the American Civil Liberties Union, the City decided
to commit to paper an official invocation policy." 20 The official policy sets
forth a two-step procedure for soliciting volunteers to offer invocations.221
"First, the city clerk compile[d] and maintain[ed] a database of the religious
congregations with an established presence in Lancaster."222 The clerk used
Lancaster's Yellow Pages to gather names of local congregations to create
the master list, looking for "churches," "congregations," and "other
religious assemblies." 223 The clerk also searched the internet for any local"church," "synagogue," "temple," "chapel," or "mosque" and consulted the
regional chamber of commerce and the local newspaper.224  No
congregations in Lancaster are discriminated against, nor does the clerk"probe the faith, denomination, or other religious belief of a congregation
before adding its name to the database."225
Second, the clerk mailed an invitation to give an invocation before the
city-council meeting to all of the gathered religious groups.26 The invitation
read:
This opportunity is voluntary, and you are free to offer the
invocation according to the dictates of your own conscience. To
maintain a spirit of respect and ecumenism, the City Council
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Rubin v. City of Lancaster, 710 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2013).
218. Id. at 1101-02.
219. Id. at 1089.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
226. Id.
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requests that the prayer opportunity not be exploited as an effort
to convert others.., nor to disparage any faith or belief different
[from] that of the invocational speaker.227
The policy made clear that it "[was] not intended, and shall not be
implemented or construed in any way, to affiliate the City Council with, nor
express the City Council's preference for, any faith or religious
denomination."228 Rather, the policy "[was] intended to acknowledge and
express the City Council's respect for the diversity of religious
denominations and faiths represented and practiced among the citizens of
Lancaster."22 9 To further those goals, each congregation was allowed only
three nonconsecutive invocations a year.230
While the majority of city-council invocations had been Christian,'
"[n]o person who ha[d] volunteered to pray ha[d] been turned down, and
no government official ha[d] ever attempted to influence the clerk's
selection or scheduling of volunteers."232 No one attending a city-council
meeting was required to participate in any invocation.233 No volunteer was
paid to pray.3 The city government did not "engage in any prior inquiry,
review of, or involvement in, the content of any prayer to be offered."23
Finally, "the clerk [had] never removed a congregation's name from the list
of invitees or refused to include one."236
Although the two prayer policies were substantially and materially
similar, only one was found to be constitutional. Both policies allowed any
clergy volunteer an opportunity to pray. Neither Greece nor Lancaster had
ever turned anyone away. Both policies utilized a government employee in
creating a master list of volunteers. No one attending meetings was ever
required to participate in the prayers. Further, the content of prayers was
strictly off-limits to government censorship. The invocations of volunteers
for both localities were wholly within their discretion. Both Greece and
Lancaster had long used only informal prayer policies. The policies of each
locality had separately resulted in a majority of the prayer-givers being
227. Id. (alteration in original).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1095.
232. Id. at 1089.
233. Id. at 1097.
234. Id.
235. Td.
236. Id.
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Christian clergy. Yet, one town was permitted by law to continue its
practice, while another was ordered to cease its practice.
The disparate outcomes of seemingly identical cases have caused citizens
in Greece to be treated differently than citizens in Lancaster. Both citizens
live and claim protection under the same United States Constitution.
Nonetheless, the prayer policy in Greece was deemed unconstitutional,
while the one in Lancaster was deemed constitutional. This is exactly the
type of situation Justice Thomas derided in his dissent from the refusal to
grant certiorari in Utah Highway Patrol Ass'n v. Am. Atheists, Inc.237
Constitutional protections should not be applied in such a fickle manner.
3. The Expression of Pre-existing Rights Will be Chilled
A third, and equally dangerous consequence of the current
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is the chilling of fundamental rights.2 31
Religious expression, a fundamental right enshrined in the Constitution,239
will most certainly be chilled when "subjected to the cold machinery of
contemporary establishment jurisprudence.""24 The Supreme Court has
long recognized the grave danger of chilling protected rights, especially First
Amendment rights.24 ' First Amendment freedoms are not only "delicate
and vulnerable," but also "supremely precious in our society."242 As Justice
Brennan recognized in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, "[i]t is characteristic
of the freedoms of expression in general that they are vulnerable to gravely
damaging yet barely visible encroachments. '243 The uncertain and vague
Establishment Clause jurisprudence of the Court should cause the same
concern and consternation the "vague" standards caused Justice Brennan in
Paris Adult Theatre 1.24 Justice Brennan reminded the Court that
237. Utah Highway Patrol Ass'n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011).
238. See, e.g., Monte Kuligowski, The Supreme Court's Dilemma Respecting Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence, 38 CUMB. L. REv. 245, 276 (2008).
239. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
240. Kuligowski, supra note 238, at 276.
241. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 91 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 416 (1971); United States v. Thirty-Seven
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 367-75 (1971); Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636
(1968); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-60 (1965); A Quantity of Copies of Books v.
Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964) (plurality opinion).
242. Paris Adult Theatre 1, 413 U.S. at 93 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
243. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963).
244. Paris Adult Theatre 1, 413 U.S. at 91 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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"[b]ecause First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive,
government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity. 245
If First Amendment rights are to be saved from government officials and
everyday citizens resorting to the safer alternative of purging all religious
expression from the public sphere, the Court must adopt a more consistent
and workable jurisprudence in this area. When lower court judges are
applauding "heroic attempt[s] to create a new world of useful principle out
of the Supreme Court's dark materials, '2 6 the reality of the present
predicament ought to shine brightly. "The outcome of constitutional cases
ought to rest on firmer grounds than the personal preferences of judges.1247
B. Galloway Continued the Problem
In the summer of 2014, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to take a
small step in righting the wayward Establishment-Clause ship.
Unfortunately, its opinion in Town of Greece v. Galloway only further
entrenched the existing precedential course. Justice Kennedy, writing for a
5-4 majority, relied heavily upon the reasoning in Marsh v. Chambers to
uphold the constitutionality of the Town of Greece's prayer policy.24
The facts of the case, as used by the Supreme Court, were found by the
District Court for the Western District of New York and used by the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and are set forth above.249 Justice
Kennedy began the opinion by noting that the purpose of the prayer
opportunity was to solemnize the event and invoke divine guidance by
following a tradition practiced by Congress and many state legislatures.25°
After recounting the relevant facts, Justice Kennedy noted that the
respondents25' did not seek an end to the prayer practice, but rather sought
an injunction that would require prayers to be "inclusive and ecumenical"
and refer only to a "generic God."252
245. Id. at 90-91.
246. Yet, even the redoubtable colleague of Judge Fernandez could not accomplish such a
feat. Card v. City of Everett, 520 F.3d 1009, 1023 (9th Cir. 2008) (Fernandez, J., concurring)
(footnote omitted).
247. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677,697 (2005).
248. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1815 (2014).
249. See supra Part III.A.2.
250. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1816.
251. Respondents, Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens, became offended by the prayer
practice after attending town board meetings to speak about issues of local concern. Id. at
1817.
252. Id. (citations omitted).
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On summary judgment, the district court upheld the prayer practice,
finding no impermissible preference for Christianity even though
Christians gave the vast majority of the prayers. 253 The district court did not
think the First Amendment required Greece to invite clergy from
congregations beyond its borders to ensure a minimum level of religious
diversity.25 Likewise, the district court rejected respondent's argument that
legislative prayer must be nonsectarian.55 So long as the prayer opportunity
was not being "exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage
any other, faith or belief," the content of the prayers would not be
scrutinized.256
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed." 7 The Second
Circuit adopted a reasonable observer test, finding that some aspects of the
prayer conveyed the message that Greece was endorsing Christianity.58
Specific aspects of the prayer policy, such as Greece not advertising the
opportunity to the public or inviting clergy from congregations outside the
town limits, all but ensured a distinctively Christian viewpoint.259 Even
though sectarian references were not per se unconstitutional in legislative
prayers, the Second Circuit found the "steady drumbeat" of Christian
prayer problematic.26 ° Without other faith traditions to diversify the
"drumbeat," Greece had impermissibly affiliated itself with Christianity.261
Lastly, the Second Circuit also considered it relevant that clergy would
sometimes speak on behalf of all present, request all to stand or bow their
heads, and that board members would participate in the prayer by bowing
their heads or making the sign of the cross. 262
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the judgment of the
Court of Appeals. 263 The Court looked to the holding and reasoning in
Marsh v. Chambers to assess the constitutionality of Greece's prayer
practice. 2' The Court noted that in Marsh, legislative prayer, while religious
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. (citation omitted).
257. Id. at 1818.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See generally id. at 1818-28.
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in nature,. had long been understood as compatible with the First
Amendment.26 Again, the Court emphasized that the purpose of legislative
prayer is to solemnize the event and invoke divine guidance in the pursuit
of "a just and peaceful society. 2 66 Marsh treated the prayers as "tolerable
acknowledgement[s]" of widely held beliefs, and not a dangerous step
towards establishing a religion.2 67
The Court also pointed out that the Marsh opinion carved out an
exception to the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence because the
holding did not rely on any of the formal Establishment Clause tests.268
Instead, Marsh relied on history and tradition to support the conclusion
that legislative prayers are compatible with the Establishment Clause.269 Yet,
Justice Kennedy tried to distance himself from the idea that history and
tradition can cloak unconstitutional practices with legitimacy.2 7° The
"history and tradition" test of Marsh allows courts to reference historical
practices and understandings when ascertaining a practice's
constitutionality.27" ' Here, an immediate question arises in this distinction.
How can a court know that history should not be referenced for a historical
practice? If the constitutionality of the practice is in question, and history
and tradition are insufficient to make an otherwise unconstitutional
practice constitutional, then a reference to history and tradition should not
be relevant. To the extent that it has any relevance, the relevance must be
limited since history is purportedly not enough to make a practice
constitutional. Justice Kennedy cited to his concurrence in County of
Allegheny to attempt to clarify that courts merely reference history and
tradition in order to properly interpret the Constitution.2 72 The difference
between referencing history and tradition to properly interpret a practice
and allowing history alone to interpret the practice is ambigious. When a
historical practice exists, what else could serve to illegitamize the practice?
Searching the framers' intent might be a possible retort. However, history is
typically used to determine the framers' intent. It seems there isn't a
discernable difference.
265. Id. at 1818.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1819.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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This analysis that relies on only history and tradition becomes
problematic when history or tradition reveals nothing. In justifying the
Town of Greece's prayer program, Justice Kennedy noted that history
supports the practice of local legislative bodies having such a prayer
program. 273 Despite the fact that no information had been cited by the
respondent or petitioner regarding the historical foundation for legislative
prayer at the local level, Justice Kennedy found the necessary historical
foundation.274 This was important for Justice Kennedy to do because Marsh,
the majority's only touchstone, was justified based on an "unbroken history
of more than 200 years. '275 Had there been no historical foundation for
legislative prayer at the local level, would Greece's prayer program be less
constitutional? Justice Kennedy's reasoning points in that direction.
However, Justice Kennedy's flawed use of history is merely symptomatic
of the main problem that Galloway continued. Justice Kennedy assessed
neither the object of the Establishment Clause nor the object of the
purported power the government was exercising in having a prayer
program. At first blush, it does appear that Justice Kennedy uses an object
analysis. In various places throughout the opinion, Justice Kennedy
discusses the "purposes" of the prayers given.276 Undoubtedly, Justice
Kennedy demonstrates that the prayer program has a sufficient nexus with
the "universal ends"-ends that history and tradition indicated were
constitutional. 77 Yet, determining the purpose (i.e., object) of the prayers
given is a very separate analysis from determing the object of the
Establishment Clause. Unlike the analysis of the majority in Everson,27
nowhere does Justice Kennedy look to the object of the governmental
power in order to properly interpret the scope of that power.
IV. SOLUTION
A resurrection of the "Marshall methodology" would provide courts with
the guidance so desperately needed. Once courts return to a reference to the
object, a principled standard of analysis will save the courts and the people
from the inconsistency, uncertainty, and chilling effect produced by the
arbitrary Establishment Clause jurisprudence as it currently exists. Courts
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See, e.g., id. at 1818, 1824, 1825, 1827.
277. Id. at 1823.
278. See supra Part II.B.1.
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must return to the type of analysis Chief Justice Marshall considered
necessary for assessing any exercise of governmental power. Because a
constitution does not "partake of the prolixity of a legal code," "only its
great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the
minor ingredients which compose those objects, be deduced from the
nature of the objects themselves."279 "That this idea was entertained by the
framers of the American constitution, is not only to be inferred from the
nature of the instrument, but from the language." 280 There is no reasonable
alternative but to consider the object of the exercise of power, and then
assess the means used to achieve that object.
A. Reference to the Object
In applying the "Marshall methodology" to legislative prayer cases, the
first step of the analysis is to consider the actual end or object of the grant of
power used to justify the exercise of power. As Chief Justice Marshall put it,
"[l]et the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the [C]onstitution..
."2s1 At this point, there is an important distinction that must be made so
as not to confuse the analysis. The Constitution is an agreement between
the people of the United States, granting power to the government of the
United States. 282 The government of the United States is only authorized to
exercise those powers granted, or delegated, to it by the people of the
United States and no other.28 3 However, the Constitution does not purport
to limit the powers granted to the states by the citizens of each state s.2 4 Thus,
the powers the government of the United States may legitimately exercise
are not the same as the powers the individual states may legitimately
exercise.25 Because the powers of the two governments are not the same,
the object test could look different depending on whether the prayer
practice is a state one or a federal one.286 This is because the "Marshall
methodology" looks to the object of the power used to justify the exercise of
279. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819).
280. Id.
281. Id.at421.
282. U.S. CONST. pmbl.; see also M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 403-05 (noting that the government
proceeds directly from the people).
283. Id. at 405.
284. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
285. M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 405.
286. Id. at 410 (demonstrating that the state and federal governments "are each
sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign, with respect to
the objects committed to the other.").
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power. With different powers held by the two governments, it is conceivable
that a state-specific power may be used to justify a prayer practice that
could not be used to justify a similar prayer practice of the federal
government.287
Yet, the issue can be simplified. Both state and federal governments have
legislatures that have been granted the legislative power. While the
Constitution of the United States contains the Necessary and Proper Clause,
Chief Justice Marshall did not consider the inclusion of the clause
absolutely necessary in order for legislatures generally to be able to "employ
the necessary means, for the execution of the powers conferred on the
government."2"' "General reasoning" already taught what the Constitution
made explicit.28 9 It was all too apparent to the Chief Justice that:
The government which has a right to do an act, and has imposed
on it, the duty of performing that act, must, according to the
dictates of reason, be allowed to select the means; and those who
contend that it may not select any appropriate means, that one
particular mode of effecting the object is excepted, take upon
themselves the burden of establishing that exception.29
This means that all governments granted the legislative power, state or
federal, are able to "employ the necessary means, for the execution of the
powers conferred on the government."291 In other words, all governments
with the legislative power have the benefits of a "Necessary and Proper
Clause," whether explicitly granted or not.
There is no real power granted to governments in the First Amendment;
instead, certain protected rights of the people are set forth.292 The First
Amendment states what government power may not do.293 Thus, a prayer
policy cannot be considered a means of exercising any power under the
First Amendment, but rather it must serve as a means of exercising other
governmental powers. Because neither the Constitution of the United States
nor of any state contain a specific grant of power to open legislative bodies
with an invocation, the only other option is for the power to fall under the
287. Id.
288. Id. at411.
289. Id.
290. Id. at409-10.
291. Id. at 411, 413 (finding the proposition too self-evident to have been questioned
"[t]hat a legislature, endowed with legislative powers, can legislate ... .
292. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
293. Id.
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inherent power to "employ the necessary means, for the execution of the
powers conferred on the government." '294 The question is whether the
particular legislative prayer practice is "necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers"29 vested in the
government, whether it be by "this Constitution in the Government of the
United States," '296 or by any other state constitution.
1. Analysis of the Ends
As Chief Justice Marshall explained in M'Culloch, the object of the
Necessary and Proper Clause is to explicitly state the general right to"employ the necessary means, for the execution of the powers conferred on
the government."297 "To employ the means necessary to an end, is generally
understood as employing any means calculated to produce the end, and not
as being confined to those single means, without which the end would be
entirely unattainable."298 The means need only be adequate to its ends,"calculated to effect any of the objects intrusted to the government." '299 The
means chosen do not need to be absolutely necessary or indispensable.3"'
Legislatures are not left with only those means that are "most direct and
simple."30
Can legislative prayer be considered calculated to effect the objects
entrusted to the government? The question may seem a strange one at first
glance. It may provoke questions such as, "In what ways is legislative prayer
necessary for government to execute the objects entrusted to it?" Or, "How
is legislative prayer calculated to produce the ends of any government?"
There are at least three answers to these questions.
First, although legislative prayer may not be absolutely necessary or
indispensable for the execution of granted powers (i.e., without which the
power would be nugatory), the prayer giver usually purports to invoke
divine blessing and assistance in the carrying out of all powers. Certainly,
means believed to assist a governmental body in its most essential
functions, such as legislating and decision-making, are calculated to
produce the ends of a governmental body. Because any power that exists
294. M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 411,413.
295. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 18.
296. Id.
297. M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 412-13.
298. Id. at 413-14.
299. Id. at 423.
300. Id. at 419-20.
301. Id. at 413.
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only exists by God's establishment,3 °2 it seems unremarkable that an
institution acknowledge its establishing authority. It is all the more
unremarkable when it is understood that government is a minister of
God. 30
3
John Calvin, the influential French theologian, also addressed this issue
in his Institutes of Christian Religion."4 Calvin asserted that "no government
can be happily established unless piety is the first concern; and that those
laws are preposterous which neglect God's right and provide only for
men."35 In fact, Calvin believed that "civil government has as its appointed
end.., to cherish and protect the outward worship of God. '3 6 Calvin later
noted that governing authorities are to serve faithfully as God's deputies.3 7
When governing authorities are mindful of the position they occupy, they
are not only spurred to exercise their office more justly, but also greatly
comforted in bearing the many and burdensome difficulties of their
office.30 ' As ministers of God:
How will they have the brazenness to admit injustice to their
judgment seat, which they are told is the throne of the living
God? How will they have the boldness to pronounce an unjust
sentence, by that mouth which they know has been appointed an
instrument of divine truth? With what conscience will they sign
wicked decrees by that hand which they know has been
appointed to record the acts of God? To sum up, if they
remember that they are vicars of God, they should watch with all
care, earnestness, and diligence, to represent in themselves to
men some image of divine providence, protection, goodness,
benevolence, and justice.3 9
All of this stands in the shadow of God's command to rulers: "Now
therefore, 0 kings, be wise; be warned, 0 rulers of the earth. Serve the Lord
with fear, and rejoice with trembling. Kiss the Son, lest he be angry, and you
302. Romans 13:1.
303. Romans 13:3-4.
304. 2 JOHN CALVIN, CALVIN: INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 1485-1521 (John T.
McNeill ed., Ford Lewis Battles, trans., Westminster John Knox Press reissued 2006) (1960).
305. Id. at 1495.
306. Id. at 1487.
307. Id. at 1491.
308. Id.
309. Id.
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perish in the way, for his wrath is quickly kindled. Blessed are all who take
refuge in him.""'
Second, and somewhat related to the first answer, the founders seemed to
believe that a flourishing society depended in large measure upon divine
guidance3" and a moral citizenry."' In fact, James Madison believed that
"[b] efore any man can be considered as a member of Civil Society, he must
be considered as a subject of the Governour of the Universe: And if a
member of Civil Society, do it with a saving of his allegiance to the
Universal Sovereign."313 Membership in society is conditioned on
subjection to the "Governour of the Universe."314
Building off of the first two answers, the third answer is that
acknowledgement of God is calculated to produce the ends of maintaining
and upholding the rule of law. In his 1789 Thanksgiving Proclamation,
President George Washington began by saying that "it is the duty of all
Nations to acknowledge the providence of Almighty God... and humbly to
310. Psalm 2:10-12 (English Standard Version).
311. See, e.g., BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, Prayer Request at the Constitutional Convention-and
the Response, 1787, in THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE DEBATE OVER RELIGION IN
REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 78, 79-80 (Mattew L. Harris & Thomas S. Kidd eds., 2012).
Franklin addressed the assembly, saying:
In this situation of this Assmebly, groping as it were in the dark to find political
truth, and scarce able to distinguish it when presented to us, how has it
happened, Sir, that we have not hitherto once thought of humbly applying to
the Father of lights to illuminate our understandings? ... I have lived, Sir, a
long time, and the longer I live, the more convincing proofs I see of this truth-
that God governs in the affairs of men.... We have been assured, Sir, in the
sacred writings that "except the Lord build the House they labour in vain that
build it." I firmly believe this; and I also believe that without his concurring aid
we shall succeed in this political building no better than the Builders of Babel.
Id.
312. GEORGE WASHINGTON, Farewell Address, 1796, in THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE
DEBATE OVER RELIGION IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 118, 121 (Mattew L. Harris & Thomas S.
Kidd eds., 2012). In his farewell address to the people, Washington admonished the people:
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and
morality are indispensable supports.... And let us with caution indulge the
supposition that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may
be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar
structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality
can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.
Id.
313. JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance 1785, in THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND
THE DEBATE OVER RELIGION IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 62,63 (Mattew L. Harris & Thomas
S. Kidd eds., 2012).
314. Id.
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implore his protection and favor."315 Washington did not just believe it a
good idea to pray (humbly implore Almighty God for protection and favor),
he considered it a duty. Further, Washington stated that it is a national
duty, and not just an individual duty. Likewise, Roberto Unger pointed out
that belief in a higher law, justified by a transcendent religion, was a
necessary ingredient to bring about the rule of law ideal that is so
fundamental in the Western Legal Tradition.316 Acknowledgement of belief
in a transcendent God who is a necessary source for the rule of law ideology
is not inappropriate.
2. Is the Object Legitimate?
The next step in Marshall's analysis is determining the legitimacy of the
object that a prayer policy is calculated to effect. In M'Culloch, Chief Justice
Marshall clearly believed the power to "employ the necessary means, for the
execution of the powers conferred on the government" was legitimate. 17
Further, the ultimate objects of a prayer policy must be legitimate objects of
government. Invoking divine guidance and assistance in carrying out
entrusted powers, being a member of civil society by being subject to the
"Governour of the Universe," and seeking to uphold and maintain the rule
of law by acknowledging God as the Lawgiver are all legitimate objects of
the government. After all, is not the duty of government to use wisdom in
all that it does, and to protect and maintain the foundations of our legal
order? However, were the government to pray in order to conduct an
ecclesiastical function rather than a governmental function, the legitimacy
of the object would be cast into question. This is a crucial distinction that
goes to the very heart of the Marshall methodology. A subject-only inquiry
would be insufficient to differentiate between a prayer policy that has
legitimate objects (e.g., one that is meant to lend gravity to a meeting and
invoke divine guidance) and one that does not have legitimate objects (e.g.,
one that is meant to bless a communion service offered to attendees). Only
inquiring into the object of the clause would expose the one as legitimate
and the other as illegitimate.
315. GEORGE WASHINGTON, Thanksgiving Proclamation, 1789, in THE FOUNDING FATHERS
AND THE DEBATE OVER RELIGION IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 116, 117 (Mattew L. Harris &
Thomas S. Kidd eds., 2012).
316. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 83-84 (1976).
317. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,411,413 (1819).
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B. Assessing the Particular Practice Used
Once the objects of a prayer policy are analyzed, the final step is to assess
the means chosen. "[A]ll means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter
and spirit of the [C]onstitution, are constitutional."" 8 As long as a prayer
policy is appropriate, plainly adapted to the ends it purports to achieve, and
not prohibited by a constitution, state or federal, the practice will be
considered lawful. Such determinations are highly specific to the particular
prayer policy in question. For this reason, it becomes all the more important
for courts to carefully consider the objects of the particular policy in
question.
1. Is the Practice of Legislative Prayer Proper or a Pretext?
Chief Justice Marshall made it abundantly clear that chosen means that
serve as a pretext for achieving objects not entrusted to the government will
be struck down by the court.319 "[Sihould congress, under the pretext of
executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not
intrusted to the government; it would become the painful duty of this
tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say, that
such an act was not the law of the land."32° A particular prayer policy must
be "plainly adapted" and "appropriate" for the accomplishment of objects
entrusted to the government. If it is not, it is the court's duty to say that"such an act was not the law of the land."321 Again, this analysis will turn on
the specific facts of each prayer policy. Some prayer policies may appear as
though they are simply invoking divine guidance and acknowledging God,
but, in fact, are actually attempting to impermissibly establish religion by
holding an ecclesiastical service.
2. Are There Constitutional Prohibitions?
After determining whether the means chosen are plainly adapted, the
court must next look to specific prohibitions in the letter or spirit of the
Constitution that would bar the selection of certain means. "Should
congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are
prohibited by the constitution.., it would become the painful duty of this
tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say, that
318. Id.
319. Id. at423.
320. Id.
321. Id.
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such an act was not the law of the land. 3 22 A legislature cannot choose
means that are specifically foreclosed to it. For example, a legislature
seeking to deter certain crimes cannot use cruel and unusual punishment as
a means of deterring those crimes.3 23 "But where the law is not prohibited,-
and is really calculated to effect any of the objects intrusted to the
government, to undertake here to inquire into the degree of its necessity,
would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department, and
to tread on legislative ground."3 24
The main point to address here is whether the Establishment Clause is a
constitutional prohibition of legislative prayer. Generally, the Court has
already answered, "No."32 However, Marsh relied only on history and
tradition in looking at what the Establishment Clause does and does not
prohibit. And Galloway reiterated and affirmed the teaching of Marsh.326
The meaning of the Constitution may be illumined by history and tradition,
but, as nearly all recognize, history and tradition cannot justify what would
otherwise be a consitutional violation.327
Instead, judges ought to at least begin where Everson left off. Any
analysis of the Establishment Clause must consider not only the text, but
also the object. While Everson may not have been a perfect interpretation of
the Establishment Clause, it at least considered the object.38 Everson looked
to the history and environment surrounding the drafting of the First
Amendment in order to determine its purpose. 329 The Everson Court
specifically noted that the object of the First Amendment was largely
considered the same as that of the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty.3
Judges may disagree on the exact object of the Establishment Clause.
However, the presence of disagreement does not mean that the object is
unascertainable. History and tradition may be a factor used to determine
whether the Clause meant to exclude legislative invocations, but history and
tradition should not be used as a substitute for asking what is the object of
the Clause.
322. Id.
323. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
324. M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 423-24.
325. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
326. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1828 (2014).
327. See, e.g., id. at 1819.
328. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-12 (1947).
329. Id.
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Even when Everson's conclusions on the object of the First Amendment
are used, it is clear that legislative prayer would not be constitutionally
prohibited. The freedom-loving colonists wanted to rid the newly formed
union of any ability to compel financial support for government-favored
churches. 31 The underlying creed of the First Amendment is that to"compel a man to furnish contribution of money for the propagation of
opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical."332 The First
Amendment was intended to provide protection against governmental
intrusion on religious liberty.333 Legislative prayer is not a means of the
government financially supporting any one denomination or sect. Nor is
legislative prayer forcing citizens to contribute money for the spread of
ideas. Rather, legislative prayer is a means of government officials, as
subjects, furnishing their duty to God as Governour, while also
acknowledging their position as ministers of divine justice.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts must return to an object analysis when assessing legislative prayer
claims. As Chief Justice John Marshall wrote in M'Culloch v. Maryland, "we
must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding."334 The
particulars are not set forth in the Constitution, because, by its nature, a
Constitution requires that "only its great outlines should be marked, its
important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose
those objects, be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves."33 Not
only will a reference to the object of the First Amendment in legislative
prayer cases help to stifle the persistent inconsistency, uncertainty, and
chilling of permissible religious expression, but it is also the only logical way
to ensure a "fair and just interpretation."336 Some prayer programs may turn
out to be a pretext for unconstitutional ends. Others may not be a pretext at
all, but still have unconstitutional ends. It is imperative that judges consider
the object of both the Establishment Clause and the prayer program. After
all, an object's nature is defined by its end.
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